Last Updated on February 17, 2022 by Constitutional Militia
Citizen’s Homeland Security Associations (CHSA)—Organizational Mission and Structure
Inasmuch as formation and operation of CHSA is for revitalization of “the Militia of the several States” comprise a novel and necessarily experimental program, no hard and fast directives as to what should be done can be offered in detail here. Nonetheless, certain general principles stand out, first and foremost with respect to CHSAs organizational mission and structure.
The mission of each and every CHSA they will be:
• to organize group of concerned and knowledgeable citizens in a particular Locality in a particular State;
• to study in detail the problems of “homeland security” peculiar to that Locality and State particularly those problems that the State’s existing military, law enforcement, emergency response and management, and related agencies may be sufficient to address;
• to ascertain how “the Militia of the several States”, revitalizes that State, solve, alleviate, mitigate those problems;
• to determine the best matter of actually revitalizing the Militia in that State, according to the principles of the pre-constitutional Colonial and State Militia as applied to contemporary conditions;
• to assist in drafting one or proposed statutes for that purpose and to submit those bills to the state legislature for its consideration;
• to encourage citizens from all walks of life in the State to support the passage of those bills have been to volunteer for service in the revitalized Militia on the statutory enacted into law.
In the pursuit— and, one hopes, the fulfillment—of this mission, each CHSA must embody and exemplify in all its endeavors a steadfast fealty and outspoken commitment to the moral, political, legal, economic, and social principles that animate “the Militia of the several States”.
This entails its members adherence to the tenets of national identity, integrity, and independence that “the several States”, both individually and collectively in their “more perfect Union” as “the United States of America”, “have assume[d] among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God entitle them”, and may “do all * * * Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do”.
• It entails its members’ recognition that every American’s economic prosperity demands maintenance of the institutions of private property—which depend upon individual liberty—which requires limited government—which can exist only under constitutionalism—which takes its specific form in the Constitution.
• It entails its members’ acceptance of we the people’s salient position of authority and especially responsibilities and the constitutional structure—namely, that:
First, as the embodiment, mind, heart, and voice of each of “the several States” and of the Nation as a whole, WE THE PEOPLE constitute America’s sole earthly repository and executors of legal and moral sovereignty, and wield supreme political power.
Second, WE THE PEOPLE derive their own political authority from “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God”, and perforce of this authority can delegate and have delegated only “just powers” to their institutions of government.
Third, because, in the final analysis, the actual effective execution of all “’[p]olitical power grows out of the barrel of a gun’”, and because the clause “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a freeState” expresses the practical link between political power and rightful political authority, WE THE PEOPLE must always control the gun, and never allow the gun in someone else’s hands to control them. And,
Fourth, because in armed people constitute the only true and lasting quote “homeland security” in “a free State” and under “Republican Form of Government”, begin “the right of the people to keep and bear arms must [not] be infringed” and to secure their enjoyment and make effective the exercise of that right WE THE PEOPLE must organize, arm, discipline, and train themselves in “the Militia of the several States” whenever public officials neglect, fail, refuse to do so.
Finally, it entails inculcation in every member’s mind of an unshakable belief in both;
(i) the importance of “the Militia of the several States” to the survival of constitutional government in this country—that “[a] well regulated Militia” truly is “necessary to the security of a free State” and maintenance of “a Republican form of government”; and
(ii) the ability of common Americans to revitalize the Militia by statute or, if the time proves too short for that, to weather whatever terrible storms are approaching this Nation, by themselves assuming the powers and duties of the Militia on their own recognizance.
1.) See U.S. Const. preamble.
2.) Declaration of Independence.
3.) See Declaration of Independence.
4.) As oppressors know all too well. See quotations from Chairman Mau Tse-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, First Edition, 1966), at 61.
5.) U.S. Const. amend. II (emphasis supplied).
6.) U. S. Const. Art. I § 4.
7.) U.S. Const. amend. II.
9.) U. S. Const. Art. IV § 4.
Location. Ideally, the Militia defend, protect, meet the critical needs of, and otherwise support WE THE PEOPLE in any conceivable occasion and situation of danger in every locality throughout every State. Each CHSA, however, will be formed to promote revitalization of the Militia in a particular locality in a particular State were a number of individuals has expressed an interest in advancing because of “homeland security”, and perhaps in volunteering for a Militia “company” or other unit when a statute revitalizing the Militia in that State is enacted. Initially at least, this may be the only Locality in that State, and that State the only one in the Nation, in which a CHSA exists. The choice of location for a CHSA will turn, therefore, not so much where its members and other supporters might be most needed in the future for Militia purposes, as one where it can operate effectively in the present as an advocate for revitalizing the Militia and as an educator with respect to how that should be done.
All too many patriots assume that restoring any aspect of the constitutionalism to contemporary America is well—not impossible, because the tasks of proselytizing and organizing their country as a whole are too difficult. This mistakes the problem at hand. To begin the process of returning America after constitutional fundamentals, patriots do not need to recruit most Americans most everywhere, but only enough Americans somewhere to prove the theory, establish the practice, and above also successful example. If the site of some Americans actually reestablishing self-government in their own Locality by themselves does not animate many more Americans to join in that endeavor in theirs, that America is moribund.
For that reason, the founders of CHSAs should first determine which localities in their States provide the most favorable political, economic, social, and cultural climates for promoting revitalization of the Militia—and then focus all their efforts on these areas—or even only in a single area, such as the best opportunity available. Applying the principle that “it is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness”, the goal should be to strike just the proverbial “single spark that can start a prairie fire”, for which action the proper flint, steel, and tender must be available and judiciously handled.
Within each favorable Locale, the founders must then decide on what regional basis one or more CHSAs should be organized. In some States, CHSAs may be able to take advantage of official “militia districts” already existing under the states codes otherwise, wherever practicable, CHSAs should be set up according to prevailing political or geographical patterns—for example, by counties townships, school districts, self defined suburbs (such as incorporated communities, homeowners associations, renamed developments), neighborhoods (particularly in cities and other densely populated areas), and so on—in order to conform as closely as contemporary conditions will allow to the precedents established by the pre-constitutional Colonial and State Militia, and to provide for continuity and reliability and membership. This approach may, however, proved to be unworkable or counterproductive in particular situations, in which case other principles especially suitable to the circumstances at hand should be devised and adopted.
1.) See, e.g., OfficIal Code of Georgia Annotated (Charlottesville, Virginia: LexisNexis), Volume 27 (2006), Title 36, Chapter 2, §§ 36-2-1 through 36-2-3.
Leadership. Once the founders have settled upon the most favorable locale and organizational foundation for CHSA, they must determine how and what basis the constituents of the initial leadership group (besides themselves) are to be identified, vetted, and recruited.
The authority and power of “the Militia of the several States” derived from and reflect the Militia’s identity with WE THE PEOPLE: that the Militia are THE PEOPLE, serve THE PEOPLE, I can entertain no purpose apart from or in opposition to THE PEOPLE. Therefore, each CHSA should strive to make itself a reflection, extension, an instrument of THE PEOPLE In Its Locality.
Inasmuch as a CHSA will initially have few members and even fewer leaders, those whom it does recruit in the latter capacity should embody such personal characteristics as will reflect the greatest credit on and draw the largest dividends from the community out of which they are selected. They must, of course, be volunteers. Beyond that, they must also be idealists of the strongest moral principles; realists who understand the pressing need to revitalize the Militia as soon as possible; and especially pragmatists can devise ways and means to accomplish that goal in a timely, efficient, and completely legal fashion in the face of apathy from their friends and calumny from their enemies. Moreover, they must have the self assurance necessary to convince others to join with them, the obduracy necessary to weather the opposition, and the persistence necessary to see the task through to completion come what may.
The initial core of a CHSA leadership might most likely be formed from
(i) holders of State or Local concealed-carry permits (“CCPs”) and
This is a matter, not only of ideology, attitudes, knowledge, skills, and personal experiences favorable to the Second Amendment—and, therefore, at least indirectly to the Militia as well—that such individuals share, but also, perhaps especially, of practicality: namely, that they can be easily identified, contacted, and encouraged to participate in revitalizing the Militia. Typically, CCPs are public records. And gun clubs composed of patriots might make their membership lists available, or at least serve as intermediaries through which the founders of a CHSA could contact the members.
Of the two sets of individuals—holders of the CCPs and members of rifle and pistol clubs—the former might well contain more likely candidates for the initial leadership positions in a CHSA. For, through their CCPs, these people are already in fact serving as Militiamen and performing “homeland security” functions in an ad hoc fashion, and need only to have that circumstance clarified for them to realize that participation in a CHSA is the natural collective extension of their CCPs. in contrast, members of the typical rifle and pistol club or other group promoted of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” may lack any sound understanding of, let alone functional connection to, and perhaps particular enthusiasm for, the Militia, either in principle or in practice when revitalization occurs. The problem in recruiting these people is that they might mistake a CHSA for just another Second-Amendment advocacy Association, which would render their participation unproductive and perhaps divisive until they were disabused of that notion and their energies redirected to the Amendment’s explanatory clause.
From whatever source they recruit the initial core of leaders, the founders of a CHSA should be circumspect and selective. Doubtlessly, they will be personally familiar with some of the individuals and consider them sufficiently reliable to approach immediately and directly. Others whose personalities, accomplishments, and standing in the community are unknown or open to question should be carefully scrutinized and tested for suitability. The founders might, for example, send them complementary copies of the book, Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume I, The Nation in Arms (available on Amazon) asking them to respond to a survey as to whether, and why, they would volunteer to be cadres in the CHSA, and what they could contribute to the movement to revitalize the Militia.
In any event, at the beginning numbers are far less important than quality, commitment, reputation, credibility, and capacity for hard work. The founders should search for individuals who are already culturally, socially, economically, or politically prominent figures in the community, or who otherwise exhibit honesty, virtue, and the potential for leadership of the successful assumption of responsibility. Moreover, the founders of the CHSA should realize that they will not necessarily be natural leaders. There being no rule of seniority or abstract tests for true leadership, CHSAs must discover the right of individuals by such an experiment, and allow direction to devolve upon them by dint of the members’ deference.
Recommendations for leadership cadres should be diverse. Core group composed exclusively of “gun people” would be undesirable, because:
(i) “homeland security”—the over arching purview of the Militia—subsumes many matters as to which the use of firearms may have relatively little or no place, such as providing community services in response to natural disasters or economic crises; and
(ii) the Militia are composed of WE THE PEOPLE as an entirety, not just a few individuals with special skills or interests. And if it’s opponents can falsely paint the movement for revitalization of the Militia as nothing more than an adjunct or outgrowths of the so-called “gun lobby”, they may prejudice Americans who would otherwise join if they believed it encompassed a broader base and served larger ends. This, of course, is not to deny that gun owners in fact represent a fair cross-section of Americans, and serve to promote ends that the downed to the benefit of most of their countrymen. Nonetheless, in light of its crucial importance to the Nation, and in anticipation of the controversy and even the calumny that its enemies will generate in an attempt to throttle it at its birth, the movement for revitalization of the Militia cannot afford the handicap of mistaken misdirected public perceptions.
General membership. When recruiting members for a CHSA, its leaders should follow several rules of thumb.
a. In promoting membership in a CHSA the general public, leaders need to be scrupulously specific as to its character and purposes. Unfortunately, contemporary popular discourse and especially the big media the noun “Militia” has been tainted, perforce of an almost exclusive application to various private groups of heavily armed individuals who sometimes express obnoxious beliefs and engage in obstreperous behavior. Some proponents of revitalizing “the Militia of the several States” will inevitably and unavoidably find themselves confronted with a problem that all too many of their countrymen unthinkingly tend to visualize “militia” as drawn from or tending to appeal to a racist, sectarian, socially divisive, violent, at least marginally criminal, and generally anti-government and anti-democratic sub-culture composed largely of cretins and other degenerate and disreputable characters.
American patriots, however, cannot relieve themselves of this rhetorical, propagandistic, and practical political handicap simply by the verbal device of renouncing any connection of their activities to “militia”. For “the Militia of the several States” are the very constitutional establishments they need to revitalize. “Militia” is the very name – the only name – the Constitution recognizes for these establishments, based upon some 150 years of history in the Colonies and independent States. And therefore any other designation would be at the very best non-constitutional or extra-constitutional—and in the strictest sense even unconstitutional, inasmuch as, because the Constitution itself explicitly incorporates within its federal system “the Militia of the several States”, no one (without a constitutional amendment) can set up some other entities in their place, or even assigned to them some different name. So patriots have no choice but to bite this bullet. Actually, though, viewed through the lens of legal logic, this is anything but a distasteful choice, because the constitutional position of the Militia must convince every thoughtful American that revitalization of these establishments is not at all optional, let alone an outrageous proposal.
Under these circumstances, proponents of revitalizing “the Militia of the several States” must emphasize that the militia are governmental entities, performing governmental functions, and composed of members of the supreme governmental authority in this country.
• Because the Constitution – the charter of America’s national government – expressly incorporates them as components of its federal structure. Moreover, the Constitution recognizes the Militia as preexisting and perpetual establishments of permanent character and purposes. The Constitution empowers Congress solely “[T]o provide for calling forth the Militia, not to create them. This plainly implies that the Militia exist independently of the General Government. For if the militia were merely contingent creatures of the United States, only Congress – in which “[a]ll legislative Powers [that the Constitution] grant [s] shall be vested”, and which alone may “all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution * * *all * * * Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United States”— could possibly create them. But the Constitution delegates no such power to Congress.
Also, the Constitution empowers Congress “[T]o provide * * * for governing such Part of the [Militia] as may be employed in the Service of the United States”. this plainly implies that the Militia exist independently of the States’ governments, too otherwise the States simply by just establishing their Militia, deprive the United States of the Militia’s “Service”, which is a constitutional impossibility.
Even more significantly, the Second Amendment declares that “a well regulated Militia” is necessary to the security of a free State”—compelling the conclusion that, without a Militia, “a free State” cannot come into other than merely transitory being. So the Militia are governmental entities in the most practical sense possible, because without them no “free State” could longer endure it all.
Moreover, because “a free State” and “Republican form of Government” our synonyms in America’s constitutional lexicon, “a Republican form of Government” cannot exist without a Militia, either. So, because each of “the several States” must be a “a free State” and must maintain “a Republican form of Government”, and because all of “the several States” together comprise the More “perfect union” of the United States, and because “[t]he United States shall Guarantee To Every State in this union a Republican form of Government”, therefore the Constitution serially recognizes, requires, and relies on the militia is the first and most important components of free, republican government—indeed, as the very foundations on which the continuance of such government depends in each State in the United States as a whole.
• Not surprisingly, then, the functions of the Constitution assigns to the Militia are quintessentially governmental in character. In principle, the Militia must perform whatever tasks are “necessary to the security of a free State” and requisite to the preservation of “a Republican Form of Government”. In practice, Congress must “provide for calling forth the Militia” to enforce the Constitution and other parts of “the supreme Law of the Land”— “to execute the laws of the Union”; and to protect the country against all enemies, both domestic and foreign – “to * * * suppress insurrections and repel invasions”. and “[t]he United States” must “guarantee to every State in this Union Republican form of Government”— doubtlessly the deployment of the Militia when necessary, insofar as there are other forces the Constitution expressly assigns to counter “Invasion[s”] and “domestic Violence”. thus, the Militia are the primary instruments—indeed, the defining components—of constitutional “homeland security” as to both “law” and “order”, and, as such, our primary instruments and components of the government.
For that reason, to impute advocacy or tolerance of illegal violence to proponents of revitalizing “the Militia of the several States” would be self-contradictory and absurd. The Militia are components, instruments, and the ultimate guarantors of law—indeed, of “the supreme Law of the Land”—not its opponents. Nothing the Militia would do in fact to “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” could even be arguably unlawful, because all such actions the Constitution expressly sanctions.
The Militia or governmental entities, performing governmental functions, because there are composed of some of the supreme governmental authority in this country: WE THE PEOPLE—the selfsame “WE THE PEOPLE” who “do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America” every day of its existence. the original Constitution treats the Militia as preëxisting perpetual institutions precisely because the Militia are WE THE PEOPLE and WE THE PEOPLE are the Militia. The General Government and the States can no more create, dissolve, or disregard the Militia that they can create, dissolve, or disregard their own creators and controllers: WE THE PEOPLE themselves.
So, too, the Second Amendment expressly identifies the Militia with WE THE PEOPLE when it declares that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”.
In addition, the Second Amendment commands that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” because “[a] well-regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”. Consequentially, in “a free State” each and every individual comprising “the people” has a personal political or governmental duty actually “to keep and bear Arms” in order to provide security to the State. Indeed, “the security of a free State” being of paramount importance, service in the Militia is the primary and indispensable obligation of citizenship for all Americans. For that reason, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms—which effectuates the malicious governmental power to provide that “security”—must be superior and a limitation on all other governmental powers, because the continued existence of each and every one of these powers depends in the final analysis upon the untrammeled exercise that right.
So important is “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—arising as it does out of
(i) the privilege of self-defense, which “is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of Society”;
(ii) the “right” and the “duty” of the people “to throw off [oppressive] Government”;
(iii) “the essential nature of all free governments”, which must respect “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” and the people’s “unalienable Rights”; and
(iv) WE THE PEOPLE’S specific content two “secure the common defence”— that it would necessarily be implied as an inevitable, unavoidable constraint on all governmental powers under “Republican form[s] of Government throughout the States and the United States even without the Second Amendment or the Militia clauses of the original Constitution. For “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” is the quintessence, the badge, and the ultimate means for enforcement of WE THE PEOPLE’S sovereign power.
Thus, the Constitution when written foreshadowed and even now justifies—albeit with respect to “the security of a free State” the guarantee of “a Republican Form of Government” alone—the modern often misused maxim that all “’political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. True enough, in the final analysis all political power is imposed, in the face of resistance, by main force (that is, might), even in a “free State”. But, as the Declaration of Independence recognizes, or political authority (that is, right) derives from “Laws of Nature and Nature’s God”. so, under the Constitution, out of the barrels of the militias guns can grow only political power wholly consistent with such authority. The Militia comprise the ultimate embodiments of the popular force: namely, the States and the nation, WE THE PEOPLE, in arms. As such, they constitute the vindicator’s popular authority and the guarantors of popular sovereignty. For with WE THE PEOPLE fully deployed in revitalized “Militia of the several States” there can arise no excuse for, no possibility of, and therefore no danger from the National police state—or any other scheme at odds with “free State” and “a Republican Form of Government—set up in the guise of “homeland security”.
1.) U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.15 (emphasis supplied).
2.) U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
3.) U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
4.) U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.16.
5.) See U.S. Const. art. VI, cls. 2 and 3.
6.) Emphasis supplied.
7.) Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms, by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., page 46–48.
8.) U.S. Const. preamble.
9.) U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
10.) U.S. Const. art. VI, cl 2.
11.) U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 15.
12.) U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
13.) Compare U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. with art. I, § 8 cl. 15.
14.) Id., at 8.
15.) Emphasis supplied.
16.) Compare W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 3 at 4, with Declaration of Independence, Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wallace) 655, 662-663 (1875), and U.S.Const. preamble.
17.) Quotations From Chairman Mao Tae-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, First Edition, 1966), at 61.
18.) See C.L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1942) Chapter II.
When enrolling members into CHSAs, leaders need to be selective. Because CHSAs are private entities, membership in them must be voluntary. Entry need not be open to just anyone and everyone, however. To the contrary: CHSA should be quite circumspect in its acceptance of members—aiming for only quality before quantity, and collecting assets instead of liabilities.
Initially, the core leaders should grow individuals personally known to them as qualified and reliable. Then, a system of collective sponsorship, inquiry, deliberation, and selection should be employed. Each prospective member should be approved or rejected by a vote of existing members, based on their assessment of the candidates credentials—the intent to bring that membership will be deserved, earned, or otherwise warranted, not simply conferred willy-nilly on just anyone who applies. The more difficult membership in a CHSA is to obtain, the more desirable it will be. And the more people know that selection demands demonstrated qualifications, the fewer unfit individuals seek entry. To work effectively and fairly, though, this process must be based on high, objective standards.
Qualifications should not be defined excessively, let alone exclusively, in terms of an aspirants accomplishments and affiliations within the community. For “the Militia of the several States” must depend upon ordinary, even more than outstanding, Americans; and the former Wiley outnumber the latter. Rather, the focus should be on an individual’s attitudes, knowledge, and skills necessary or desirable in each member for the CHSA effective operations. Of the three, attitudes are most important, because, without the proper attitudes, individuals will not acquire the knowledge, and even with the knowledge not develop and maintain the skills, requisite for active, effective membership. Specifically—
• To the greatest extent possible, members of a particular CHSA should be recruited from within the same Local community, for at least three reasons:
First, so that everyone in the CHSA will know, or can easily come to know, everyone else personally, not only within the CHSA itself but also everyday life. This, to instill in every member mutual familiarity, trust in reliance, strong sense of individual’s responsibility to the group, and then ethos that disdains letting down the group or any of its members.
Second, so that, upon passage of the necessary State legislation, many of the CHSA members volunteer for, and be able immediately to function in, regular Militia “company” or other unit established in that Locality.
Third, to minimize infiltration, manipulation, and takeovers of the CHSA by agents provocateurs and other troublemakers. Rogue public agencies or private groups intent on destroying the movement to revitalize “the Militia of the several States” may have at their disposal a superabundance of potential infiltrators in gross—but not in each and every particular neighborhood or other Locality. Therefore, their schemes will perforce have to rely on “foreign” faces. The likelihood that large numbers of CHSAs organized on a strictly local basis, with no or very few “outside” members, can be destabilized by such tactics will be remote.
At the minimum, state and local laws permit, each and every applicant for membership in the CHSA who is not conscientious objector should already possess—should be encouraged to obtain on his own in a timely fashion —good working knowledge of skills with various types of firearms, ammunition, and related accoutrements, at least equivalent what is taught in the National Rifle Association’s basic rifle, pistol, and shotgun courses. These qualifications could be established by the applicant status or training as a certified firearms instructor, gunsmith, or armorer; his CCP (were proven proficiency with firearm was a prerequisite); certificate of completion of suitable NRA or other standard courses; or in some other appropriate manner.
This is not intended to make membership in the CHSA contingent on some sort of paramilitary training, but only to encourage every member—who advocates the revitalization of “the Militia of the several States” to the general public – himself to satisfy, if legally possible, the fundamental principle that everyone in the Militia other than conscientious objectors should possess and know how to use his own firearm. No contradiction exists, though, between the membership in the CHSA—or in the Militia—and an individual’s conscientious objection to the personal possession and use of firearms. For many types of Militia service could be studied in the CHSA, and actually performed in revitalized Militia “companies”, without any involvement firearms at all.
• In addition, applicants for membership should be ranked and chosen on the basis of further knowledge and skills particularly suitable for “homeland security”—including former military or police service; training in self-defense and martial arts; survival or other “outdoor” skills; service or training in firefighting, rescue, emergency response units; medical, dental, paramedical practice; and familiarity with such fields as gunsmithing, engineering, construction, communications and information technology, machining, and automotive maintenance. Knowledge and skills of these types will be absolutely necessary if the CHSA to devise and test workable program for revitalization of the Militia.
• Where possible, too, CHSA should recruit individuals whose personal resources, as well as their achievements, prominence, and credibility in this community, can advance the cause. In this regard, and applicants disposable wealth, social and political position, business acumen and success, and other marks of distinction should be considered. Of course, a CHSA should never turn away applicants solely because of his lack of these accomplishments. In the final analysis, the resources most in need or good heads and stout hearts, not financial success in social éclat.
If you see CHSA finds itself with an overabundance of its members with certain talents, skills, resources, and a dearth of members, with others, it should suggest an exchange of members with neighboring CHSAs that have complementary imbalances, so as to equalize as much as possible the distribution of assets among them all.
Finally, with respect to some problems of “homeland security”, no single CHSA of reasonable size could obtain members possessed of all the necessary talents, knowledge, skills, accomplishments, and resources. But a cluster of neighboring CHSAs likely could. Therefore, in such cases the goal should be for all the necessary attributes to be represented in each cluster.
When enrolling recruits into CHSA, its leaders and members ought to be skeptical. A list of disqualifications should be drawn up, and its prescriptions rigorously enforced. Individuals prohibited from membership should include at least all:
• Aliens illegally in the United States;
• Known or suspected criminals or other individuals with demonstrated proclivities toward illegal or antisocial behavior;
• Other individuals who personal possession of firearms, ammunition, or related accoutrements may be prohibited by National, State, or Local law; and especially
• Known or suspected agitators, agents provocateurs, subversives, or other troublemakers intent when embroidering the CHSA or its members in illegal or otherwise questionable activities.
Besides always being the wary of these and other dangerous infiltrators, every CHSA should also be careful to winnow out the proverbial “summer soldiers and sunshine patriots” who will amount only to hangers–on and dead wood, taking up places more worthy individuals can occupy. No less undesirable are persons motivated by petty careerism. Every CHSA, after all, should be intended to disappear as soon as possible upon revitalization of the its State’s Militia, leaving nothing for those who desire to play the parts organizational bigwigs.
After it is fully formed and functional, a CHSA should second or loan a few of its most well-rounded members to neighboring localities in order to assist in the formation of new CHSAs there. Thus, the movement will expand across the State in a matter of drops of oil spreading on water.
Basis of organization. If Citizens’ Homeland Security Associations were to follow the pattern typically set for Militia “companies” in the pre-constitutional Colonies and States, they would organize themselves on essentially geographical and political basis—say, by counties, towns, and sections of neighborhoods and cities and suburbs. That approach worked well in the 1600s and 1700s, cause citizens’ homes, places of employment, markets, and houses of worship usually cited in relatively close proximity to one another, and the tasks of “homeland security” in that era were essentially the same for every locale in which the members of the Militia lived and worked.
Today, conversely, many people often reside at a far remove in both distance and time from their workplaces, shopping centers, recreational facilities, and depend upon public or private transportation by rail, road, or other means to travel from one location to another. Also, the problems of “homeland security” are decidedly different for:
(i) residential areas;
(ii) places of business open to the general public, such as hi-rise office buildings, shopping centers, local and state governmental complexes, schools, and hospitals;
(iii) museums, cinema complexes, parks, and sports stadia; and
(iv) transportation hubs and networks.
For that reason, the organization of a Militia “company” suitable for providing “homeland security” in (say) a residential area might not—indeed, probably would not—work for a large office building; every organization of a Militia “company” suitable for either a residential area or an office building would almost surely not be adequate for major railroad station.
In addition, not beyond the realm of possibility and practicality—and, perhaps, even necessity—is that certain individuals might find themselves members of more than one Militia “company”, depending on their locations at different times. Thus, an individual who resided in a particular neighborhood might, in an emergency, report to a Militia “company” based on that neighborhood when he was at home. When commuting to work, though, he might report to Militia “company” designated to provide “homeland security” to the commuter rail system he used. And when at work, he might serve in the Militia” company” assigned to protect the office building, business complex, or industrial park in which he was employed.
In any event, CHSAs must take considerations of this type into account when structuring themselves. How will they investigate and solve such problems will depend on the imaginations and ingenuity of their members on the spot.
1.) See e.g., Home and Family Emergency Plan (Oak Hill, Virginia: EmerPro USA, 2002); Personal Emergency Plan for High Rise Office Buildings (Oak Hill, Virginia: EmerPro USA, 2000); Personal Emergency Plan for High Rise Residential Buildings, (Oak Hill, Virginia: EmerPro USA, 2000).
Optimal size. In principle, at one extreme Citizens’ Homeland Security Association might consist of no more than a single individual—who would be better described as a Citizens’ Homeland Security Advocate. Semantics aside, to be effective such a loan activist would need to be extremely knowledgeable about the subject; experienced in the theory and practice of interpersonal and public relations, political organizing, and especially legislative lobbying; possessed of visibility, credibility, and influential connections in the community; and above all endowed with sufficient disposable funds and free time to prosecute the project continuously to its successful completion. So the likelihood of even one such persons appearing in each State is minuscule.
At the other extreme, in principle CHSA could contain many hundreds of individuals. Although this is more likely, it is even less desirable than an imaginary single activist, for several reasons:
First, a very large CHSA would be organizationally impractical. The larger in size, the more unwieldy its operation. Moreover, as is typical in large groups, relatively few members would end up performing most of the CHSA’s necessary work; while shirkers would disappear in the anonymity of the crowd of hangers-on who managed, on one excuse or another, to participate in the CHSA’s activities infrequently if at all.
Second, an overly large CHSA complicate planning. If it contain members from several geographical areas, it would be to split up its membership into various regional committees to deal effectively with the problems of “homeland security” in each of those areas—a cumbersome and tedious task that can be avoided in the first instance simply by forming several CHSAs on a regional basis.
Third, same reason and excessively large CHSA would be politically counterproductive. Its members lived in several legislative districts, to maximize its effectiveness the CHSA need to divide itself into that many separate committees—which could have been accomplished more easily in the first place through the formation of several CHSAs.
A proliferation of CHSAs does not entail inefficiency, because the purpose of each of them is to “model” a Militia “company” or other unit of the State’s revitalized Militia within the its own area. The most realistic “model” is always the one made to exact full scale. So ideally, a CHSA should contain the number of individuals that would constitute a Militia unit.
This is not because a CHSA is intended itself to function as a private “militia” or other para-military organization, but instead because each CHSA should be designed and operated as an advisory committee for it States legislature:
• to evaluate and test, under the most realistic local conditions, competing theories of what size particularly Militia units should be in particular Locales, so as to be able
• to draft, in cooperation with other CHSAs, the proper statute on the basis of these experimental results, and in the course of that work
• to encourage a commitment from significant numbers of individuals to volunteer for these Militia units on the necessary statute has been enacted.
As the foregoing suggests, only careful thought and diligent experimentation to determine what the best form, size, and composition of any particular Militia unit in a particular locality should be. Each CHSA must test various approaches by trial and error. And the more varied, original input into the problem, and competition and ideas—as reflected in a multiplicity of CHSAs —the better.
Self-evidently, too, in a fully revitalized system Militia “companies” should always be relatively small in terms of their individual memberships, and therefore very numerous—the result being that they will be so highly dispersed throughout each state is essentially to saturate her territory. This is absolutely necessary because, in the event of the worst possible case—that being either domestic usurpation and tyranny, or foreign invasion, all of which would likely compel the Militia to operate according to the strategy and tactics of irregulars or guerrilleros – the Militia control resistance, activists, and supplies from small, secure, secret bases scattered essentially everywhere, which the oppressors would have difficulty discovering, let alone destroying, in their entirety or even insignificant number.
In practice, the most manageable size for a particular CHSA the matter of its own research and experimentation. For it will depend upon, and therefore must be tailored to, the actual locale in which the CHSA will operate—in terms of the type of community, the size of its population, the nature and extent of its territory, the tasks relating to “homeland security” to be undertaken there, the number of qualified individuals who can be recorded within the area, the propinquity of other CHSAs, and so on.
In a cluster of CHSAs, though, it might prove useful to have one more of them structured as “specialist” units, for which their particular tasks or equipment would determine their sizes.
Physical facilities and logistics. A CHSA or its individual members should have access to— but would not necessarily need ownership of whatever physical facilities were necessary for meetings, study, experimentation with different models for Militia organization and training, and other program activities.
At first, CHSA’s meetings could be held in the members private homes, then (as he organizations expanded in size) in a rented hall.
Studies could generally be conducted in private dwellings, with the CHSA’s membership divided into subgroups of convenient size, the organization providing a lending-library the contents of which would circulate among various members homes.
Knowledge and instruction in the safe use of firearms are absolutely essential for all Americans as a consequence of their constitutional duty to serve in the Militia and therefore to prepare themselves for that service. But instruction will require specialized facilities not economically feasible for every CHSA to supply. So, where State and Local laws allow, CHSA should encourage each member to:
(i) provide himself with one or more suitable firearms;
(ii) obtain access to firearms range, gun club, or equivalent facility; and
(iii) engage in regular training of specified kinds of his own. In some areas, the absence of suitable facilities for the use of firearms could be overcome by having familiarization and practice performed with air rifles and pistols, which could be done (Local ordinances and safety considerations permitting) in the backyard, garage, or cellar of almost any private home.
With respect to other educational needs, a CHSA should take advantage of the facilities available to private citizens in the area – such as Red Cross courses in first aid and CPR, schools teaching paramedical and emergency response skills first aid and CPR, schools teaching para-medical and emergency—response skills, schools of martial arts, groups that provide instruction on survival and other “outdoor” techniques, and so on. And where instruction relating specifically to “homeland security” is offered only to members of governmental agencies, at their facilities, each CHSA that can should recruit personnel from these agencies to conduct informal instruction for its own members, and should encourage public officials to open such facilities to suitably qualified members of every CHSA of the general public.
Finances. Inasmuch as a CHSA cannot function without funds, their source must be a major concern from the beginning. After the core leaders have supplied the monies necessary to start the process, the members themselves most afraid both their own and the organization’s expenses—just as Militia units were required to do under the pre-constitutional Colonial and State Militia Acts, and should be required to do under any modern State statute. Thus, good test of the commitment of any CHSA will be his willingness, within the limits of his resources, to bear the economic burden of membership.
Each CHSA should collect sufficient funds to meet them all operating expenses regular membership dues and assessments. Also, inasmuch as they are “modeling” Militia “companies”, CHSA’s might employ the method of self-finance commonly mandated in pre-constitutional Colonial and State Militia Acts: namely, imposition of “fines” for members failure to satisfy organizational requirements. For example, if without detriment to itself a CHSA could lawfully require that each of its members (of even conscientious objectors) should equip himself with a suitable rifle, ammunition, and necessary accoutrements, and when so furnished should pass appropriate safety and firing-range-qualification tests, it might also stipulate that failure to do so within a certain period results an assessment of fines to be paid into the CHSA’s general fund—and, absent payment, dismissal of the defaulter from the CHSA. Of course, if under State or Local law such a membership requirement might arguably transform the CHSA into some sort of “military organization”, it cannot be used.
In any event, the spirit of fraternal cooperation necessary for the success of a CHSA, and ultimately of the Militia, these sources of income should be supplemented as occasion requires with outright grants from wealthier members and patrons, to alleviate the burden on those economically less well off.
Organizations or groups outside of the movement to revitalize the Militia might be solicited for assistance with funding of CHSAs, particularly for extraordinary expenses. Such subsidies must be most carefully scrutinized, however, because an apparent “gift” of money could also serve donors ulterior motive to control, coöpt, subvert, or taint the CHSA receiving it. And in all instances, each CHSA must deal appropriately with all funds collected from any source, in terms of accounting for income and expenditures, compliance with any applicable tax codes, and so on.
1.) Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms, by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., page 136.
Organizational self-defense. When dealing with leadership, membership, and funding of the CHSA, and all its operations, emphasis should be placed on protecting the organization and its members. Undoubtedly, opponents of revitalizing “the Militia of the several State” will attempt to discredit, distract and deflect from the mission, debilitate, destabilize, and if possible destroy CHSAs in every practicable way. These attacks must be foreseen, forestalled, and frustrated.
Externally, opponents assaults will range from derision—captures criticisms that the Militia are operationally “outdated” and “useless”; defarmation—charges that CHSAs are camouflaged private “militia” or “para-military organizations” of some dangerously “extremist” cast; outright delegitimization—campaigns of extra-legal or illegal harassment. Everyone of these tactics can be thwarted, however, provided that CHSAs adhere strictly to and always rely on constitutional principles in all of their operations. This will prove to be every CHSA’s greatest strength. For, in contrast to self-styled private “militia”, CHSA’s will be able to assert not simply their members’ individual rights “to keep and bear Arms”, but also assert their members’ collective rights to associate, speak out in public, and petition public officials—all for the ultimate purpose of promoting legislation aimed at restoring “the Militia of the several States” to their rightful governmental status and functions as the best, if not the only, means to deal with the contemporary challenges of “homeland security”.
Internally, opponents will surely launch attacks that could prove far more dangerous, because they were aimed precisely at diverting CHSAs from the constitutional principles that form their most effective defense, thereby fully exposing them to external threats.
One predictable tactic will be infiltration. Not simply by informers and moles, who will use their positions to spy and then betray confidences. But also by agents of influence: individuals who attempt to weaken a CHSA by disrupting its internal activities with artificial power-struggles; debates, disputes, and diversions into issues unrelated to revitalization of the Militia; politicization in favor of a particular party or candidates for elective office; personality conflicts; bureaucratic wheel-spinning; or dissipation of funds. And, worse yet, by agents provocateurs: individuals who will promote actions designed to blacken CHSA’s reputation with the general public and to set up its members for assaults by rogue law-enforcement agencies.
Another expectable tactic will be infusions of money with “strings attached”, the donors intending to divert the CHSA from its proper mission, infested with agents of influence or agents provocateurs, or to blacken its reputation and destroy its credibility by subtly exposing some notorious group or individual as the original source conduit of the funds.
To deal with these difficulties, in addition to restricting membership to individuals who actually live in the Locality each CHSA or cluster of CHSAs should appoint a “counterintelligence committee” to perform the necessary investigation and oversight of leaders, members, outside contributors, and related matters, bringing any adverse findings to the membership for action as soon as possible.
1.) Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms, by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., page 86-88.
2.) Id., at 161-162
Legal form. Another important consideration is what legal form a CHSA should take—for example, a private unincorporated association, a nonprofit corporation, tax-exempt entity, and so on. On the one hand, because revitalization of the Militia will take considerable time (anywhere from 1 to 5 years, if Providence smiles on the endeavor), CHSAs may have a considerable life-expectancy. On the other hand, upon statutory revitalization of the Militia in a particular State, CHSAs there would no longer serve any purpose; and many of their members would volunteer for and be absorbed into regular Militia “companies” or other units. Thus, having performed their function, the CHSAs would be transformed by attrition into mere shells. Dissolution being their eventual fate when they succeed in their mission (and the sooner the better for that), organizing CHSAs in any complex form—such as tax-exempt, nonprofit corporations—would simply consume time and resources, and tie up members in needless formalities, to no particular long-term purpose. This is especially true in consideration of the large number of CHSAs that might be created—and then dissolved—in any State in which the movement for revitalization of the Militia took hold.
All in all, the best legal form for CHSA would probably be that of simply a private unincorporated association. Such an entity could avoid most, if not all, onerous governmental regulation, oversight, reporting-requirements, and other burdens imposed on corporations. And, unlike a typical corporation, a CHSA structured as a private unincorporated association could not be successfully subverted by agents of influence or agents provocateurs who managed to finagle themselves into leadership positions. If an internal coup succeeded in taking over a CHSA in the corporate form, the plotters would gain control of the entity, its corporate name and charter, it’s bank account, any physical facilities it owned or leased, and any special legal privileges it enjoyed (such as tax-exempt status). The loyal members would then have either to comply with the plotters’ dictates, or to lose the right to participate in the CHSA’s activities and use its facilities; and the latter case would then have to bear the costs and cut through the legal red tape necessary to form a new corporation to carry on their own work. Conversely, if some cabal seized control of a CHSA organized as a private unincorporated association—which owned no physical facilities and operated with funds contributed by members on an ad hoc basis only as debts became due—the loyal members could simply take their persons, their money, and their willingness to work for revitalization of the Militia with them, and recognize themselves elsewhere, leaving the plotters with essentially nothing.
In any particular case, the choice of an organizational form for a CHSA should be made only with the advice of legal counsel—particularly as to proper accounting for funds raised and expenses paid, tax questions, State and Local zoning and other codes that might impact meetings and other group activities, insurance (especially where firearms instruction and practice are involved), reporting requirements and other restrictions on lobbying State legislators, and so on. For example, in some States, although local CHSAs could remain unincorporated associations, it might prove beneficial, even if not absolutely necessary, to create a single tax-exempt corporation for the purpose of conducting all the lobbying efforts that state law subjected to registration and reporting.
Members of CHSAs need to avoid being tripped up on these matters, so that they do not end up fighting unproductive battles with ignorant and hostile bureaucrats and judges over legal technicalities, rather than succeeding in revitalizing the Militia.